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ABSTRACT 
In power markets, operating reserve procurement is 
usually centrally handled according to certain 
reliability rules and aiming at minimization of total 
cost for reserve procurement. In this approach, there 
are no customers’ choices, no incentives for IS0 to 
minimize the total cost or for reserve suppliers to 
commit promised reserve capacity. It may leads to 
severe inefficiency. In this paper, we propose a 
decentralized approach for operating reserve 
procurement and in the meantime, to discover the 
market price for it. In the approach, each participant 
selects the optimal decision to maximize his or her 
own interests. Insurance theory is applied; which 
allows consumers to transfer their risk for financial 
loss of outage to the ISO, and induces incentive for 
the IS0  to manage the entire amount of reserve 
capacity in an efficient manner. A penalty system is 
introduced, which improves the liability for the 
genco to provide operating reserve. Detailed math 
model and solution procedure are presented. It is 
also shown that with properly defined reserve 
market’s structure, the decentralized approach can 
yield same optimal solution as its centralized 
counterpart. Numerical example results illustrate the 
effectiveness of the suggested approach. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Operating reserves is an ancillary service, which is 
extra generation available capacity that can he 
generated immediately if required [ I ] ,  [2]. With the 
operating reserve, the hulk-power system has the 
capability to arrest the contingency: include 
generation outage or transmission outage. 
Currently, an independent system operator (ISO) is 
introduced, who responses to ensure the security and 
reliability of the network. To improve the efficiency, 
competition between reserve providers was 
introduced in operating reserve procurement [3]. The 
I S 0  acts as a single buyer, with the objective to 
minimize the entire procurement cost, with a defined 
operating reserve requirement. Those approaches 
minimize the consumers’ interruption. However, it 
lacks consumers’ preference consideration and 
cannot guarantee the efficiency of the reserve 
procurement. 
In order to maximize the social welfare. customers’ 
preference should be considered. With the economic 
theory, the best way to include customers’ 
preference is to allow customers’ choice under a 
decentralized decision environment, which can 
maximize the economic efficiency. 
With the application of insurance policy ‘41.[61, the 
authors [’I. [‘I conducted a conceptual study on 
decentralized reserve procurement and pricing. The 
works [7], [8] proved, with a simple case, that 
insurance policy can be used to design a 
decentralized market for reserve procurement, which 
allows the customers’ choice, induces incentives and 
enforces the liability for the I S 0  to provide reserve 
capacity. The optimal decision maximize the 
economic efficiency, and the pool-based approach is 
cost effective than the contract-based approach. 
A detail model of a centralized optimization decision 
making, for deregulated market environment with 
the consideration of the individual welfare, was 
developed to determine the price and the optimal 
quantity of operating reserve for individual [9]. It is 
proven that, in order to maximize the social welfare, 
different consumers should have a different reserve 
requirement. 
In this paper, a decentralized operation environment 
will he developed for operating reserve procurement. 
(Hereafter, reserve capacity is referred for operating 
reserve only.) Assuming that there is a pure 
competitive market, each participant has the ability 
to make decision on the optimal supplyidemand 
quantity of the reserve capacity at the market reserve 
price. Microstructure, math model and optimal 
process for the decentralized approach will be 
presented in section 2, 3 and 4 respectively. 
Moreover, the paper will be finalized with a 
discussion and a conclusion. 
2. DECENTRALIZED DECISION PARADIGM 
FOR RESERVE MARKET 
Assuming that there are N gencos ( C , , i = l - N )  
and M Consumers (C,, j = 1 - M )  in the market, an 
independent system operator (ISO) coordinates the 
reserve capacity procurement. Under a decentralized 
decision paradigm, the I S 0  will no longer make 
centralized decision. It acts as a profit-neutral 
coordinator in the reserve market. The N-l security 
assumption is held, i.e. only one genco is in 
forced-outage at a time. Transmission network 
impact is not taken into account. For the studied 
time interval, say one-hour, we know from the spot 
market that genco C, supplies electricity S ,  and 
consumer C, consumes electricity Q, with 
For the reserve market, genco G, provides reserve 
capacity Rc, and consumer C, demands reserve 
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M 
capacity R, , there should be $RG, = x R q  = R ,  . 
li iil 
where R,,, is arranged based on the loses 
electricity (Qc,/Qz).SGh and R, available, i.e. 
The reserve capacity will he generated in the event 
of outage occurs. (The generated reserve capacity is 
referred as reserve energy.) However, when a 
generator G, is in forced-outage, the 
corresponding reserve capacity will not he available, 
which cause the entire available reserve capacity less 
than the entire demand of reserve capacity. 
Therefore, a supplementary reserve provider G, is 
introduced to provide reserve capacity and 
corresponding. reserve energy, which should 
originally he provided by genco G, . The 
supplementary reserve capacity R,, is defined as a 
certain percentage ( r&)  of total reserve capacity R,, 
i.e. Rob = r,RL, and rb should be large enough to 
make RGb = rARx t R,, for all i. 
The basic idea of reserve capacity market is as 
follows. The I S 0  announces an initial guess on 
reserve capacity prices for buying it from gencos at 
PRG and from the supplementary reserve provider 
PR' and selling it to consumers at P,' . According 
to the prices, each genco determines how much 
reserve capacity ( T G j )  it will sell based on its fixed 
production cost and each consumer determines the 
amount it will buy (T , )  based on its loss under 
supply interruption. If ITGj = 1 T, = Tx, the market 
task is implemented; if not, the price should he tuned 
properly until the balance is set up. In this paper, 
"T" means contracted reserve capacity and " R  
means committed reserve capacity. If the 
microstructure of reserve market is well defined, 
"R" should be equal to "T". 
Two policies are introduced for operating reserve 
procurement, namely, insurance policy and penalty 
policy. 
2.1. Insurance policy between I S 0  (insurer) and 
consumers (insured) 
Consumers buy reserve capacity To at reserve 
capacity price PRc from IS0  and pay a premium to 
the I S 0  for insurance policy in order to shift the risk 
for financial loss of outage to the ISO. IS0 procures 
reserve capacity R, (may be different from To ) for 
consumer C, . When an outage occurs at yenco G, , 
the IS0 arranges reserve energy R,,, to consumer 
C, according to certain rules (see (2)) and pays a 
claim gc,,h(R,,h) (see ( I ) )  to the consumer C, to 
compensate his financial loss according to insurance 
policy. Suppose that 
x M 
/ _ I  ,=I 
(R,,h) takes the form 
gcii (a,) = K ,  -[Oca> (k" + PREh -l'O.hl. 0 5 K, 1 i1) 
Oc,, (&) denotes the outage cost of consumer 
C, , who loses electricity (Qq/QI).SCh and having 
reserve energy RC,) when outage occurs at 
gencoG, . f R E , h  is reserve energy price at genco 
Gh outage. K, denotes the percentage of the 
outage cost that consumer C, can claim from the 
I S 0  in the event of outage occurs. It is proven in [7] 
that, rational consumers will decide to purchase a 
full-cover insurance, i.e. K,,ap, = I  . We shall take 
K, = I  in our study. Expression for OC,,h(R,b) 
will he given later. 
2.2. Penalty policy between genco and IS0 
With the penalty system, the IS0 pays genco G, 
for contracted amount of reserve capacity T, and 
monitors the actual amount of available reserve 
capacity R ,  . If an outage occurs at C, , genco G, 
will be asked to generate the reserve energy RG<,&. 
If R ,  <Tc, , genco G, should pay a penalty 
f,,, (Rc,,TG,) to [SO. f,, (RGj,TGi) is defined as a 
quadratic function: 
The penalty function has a factorP,' $08 , If IS0  
pays a higher reserve capacity price, he should he 
able to receive a higher penalty in case a genco does 
not commit the provision. Secondly, the probability 
of reserve energy usage will be reduced with respect 
to the reduction of the outage probability. The 
expected penalty will be reduced consequently. 
Therefore, the penalty should he increased to 
maintain the incentive for gencos to commit on 
providing their contracted reserve capacity. 
3. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION FOR 
INDIVIDUALS 
The mathematical models for the market participants 
are similar to the centralized decision model in [9]. 
The reserve capacity payment collected from 
consumers is equal to the reserve capacity payment 
distributed to gencos and supplementary reserve 
provider, i.e. P,'.R, =f ," .R ,+fRA.RGA.  According 
to RG, =rAR, , the prices' relationship can be 
expressed as: 
/,=, 
P,' = PRG +'A . PR" (4) 
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3.1. Math model for gencos 
For genco G, , it has fixed production cost function 
C,, ( R , )  (of opportunity cost nature) in providing 
reserve capacity R,, , and resewe energy production 
cost PC,,, (RGj,h) at genco C, outage: 
PC,,,h (L) = c,, (s, + L) - C ,  (L), (f = 1 - N ,  i # h )  (5) 
where Cc, (.) is genco G, ' s  variable production cost 
function (mainly fuel cost) and genco G, really 
produces reserve energy at RG,,h with S,, as spot 
market scheduled electricity production. 
Supplementary reserve provider G, will take over 
the outage genco G, 's duty to provide reserve 
energy, i.e. RG,,, = Rch,h. The corresponding reserve 
energy production cost PCGAZ ( R G A , A )  should he 
paid by the outage genco G, to G, i.e. we 
assumed G, is protit-neutral in reserve energy 
production and 
PCG,., ( $ h . h )  = PC6A.h (L) (6) 
With the penalty policy, genco G, has the 
following expected-profit (EP,,) maximization 
problem 
Max EPG, ( R ,  Tti, 1 = P: . Tc, - %, ( R ,  1 
+&OK h., .[P8,,, $,, - PC,,, ( k k )  -fci,h (R,,T,O] ( 7 )  
s . f .  R,,,, 2 RG, 
Assuming that the supplementary reserve provider is 
reliable without penalty being enforced, his 
expected-profit (EP,,) maximization problem can 
be expressed as 
Max 
S. I .  RGA,mar 2 R,, 
There is no reserve energy relevant item in (8) since 
genco C, will pay the amount, PC,,,h (RGA,h ) ,  to 
genco G,. 
3.2. Math model for consumers 
In spot market, consumer C, obtains benefit 
Bcj(Qcj)  with electricity Qcj purchased from the 
spot market at market clearing pricep,, . With the 
pool-based approach, each consumer C, will lose a 
small amount of electricity (Q,/Q~).&~ if genco 
Gh outage. The Corresponding outage loss is 
defined as the loss of benefit, so-called outage cost 
and denoted as OC,,,+ ( f u n )  
OC,, ( ~ Q , A ) = [ B ,  (e,) - FWc 
- [4 j (Qq  - ~ . a + l ' , , ~ ) - ~ , ~ . ( Q , - ~ . ~ ~ ~ ) ]  
4 .ir. 
(R,) = P," .RGA - C,, (R,) 
(8) 6.9 
(9) 
where f& is real reserve energy designated for 
consumer C, at G, outage based on the 
contracted amount of reserve capacity T, . The first 
term of (9) is consumerc, 's utility without outage 
and the second term is new utility with G, outage 
with obtained reserve energy f Q , h  considered. The 
charge for reserve energy f Q , h  (i.e. Par,h. fcj,& ) is 
not included in (9). For a rational consumer, he will 
purchase a full-cover insurance policy [7] ,  therefore, 
the expected claim is expressed as 
g,.h (fw) = 0% (fw )+ 6 t . h  'f,.h (10) 
With the insurance policy, consumer C, has the 
following expected-cost (EC,) minimization 
problem 
where similar (see (2)),  we have 
gci,h(kq,h) and g, ,h( f , ,h)  are defined in (I) 
(with K ,  = I ) and (10) similarly. OCQC (R,>) is real 
outage cost of C, at G, outage in (9) with 
replaced f,,h by k,,h . With full-cover insurance 
(IO),  the consumer's expected net outage cost should 
be equal to zero. 
3.3. 
I S 0  pays reserve capacity payments to the gencos 
and the supplementary reserve provider, receive 
premiums from consumers and pays claims to the 
consumers in the event of outage occurs. All the 
reserve energy payments received from consumers 
will be distributed to gencos. I S 0  solves for reserve 
capacity requirement for consumers R,, j =  I - M 
and R, = f R, to minimize the entire reserve 
related cost. The objective function can be expressed 
as 
Mi~EC,(R, ,RL)=P, ' ,RI+P, ' .8 .RL 
Math model for the I S 0  
,.I 
&..RI 
N .  M ^  
/=I ,=, with 1 R , , , ,  = 1 and eqn. (4), we can see that 
the I S 0  has a cost-neutral characteristic if he 
maintaining Rg , which is equal to T, , i.e. 
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EC,(R,)=O for R,=T, . It is proven in [7]; 
insurance policy induces incentives for the IS0 to 
maintain reserve capacity at Rq =T, and 
Rq,b=fc l ,h  forall j = l - M  a n d h = l - N .  
Although Z R , >  = 8 R,,& and the reserve energy 
allocation does not affect the ISO's cost function, 
the IS0  is responsible to optimize $, to 
minimize the social production cost iPCRi , ,  (R<i,,h) 
for society. The minimization problem for reserve 
energy selection can be expressed as 
N "  M .  
/=I  ,=I 
i=, 
Assuming that the gencos bid the electricity for the 
spot market according to the marginal cost of 
electricity, the marginal production cost function for 
reserve energy should he equal to the marginal cost 
function ofthe electricity. (see ( 5 ) )  
Therefore, without the bidding for reserve energy, 
IS0 should he able to solve (14) with the electricity 
bidding information. 
4. DECENTRALIZED DECISION PROCESS 
4.1. Individual Optimal Conditions 
The optimization problem of gencos, supplementary 
reserve provider, consumers and IS0 can be solved 
by the Lagrangian relaxation method. The 
corresponding optimal conditions are summarized as 
follows. (Assumed all the inequality constraints are 
satisfied and the corresponding Lagrangian 
multiplier are neglected) 
1) Genco's optimal conditions for solving R,, T ,  
are: 
R ,  = T, 
Eqn. (16) shows that, the penalty function induces 
incentives for the gencos to maintain an amount of 
reserve capacity same as the amount they hided. 
2 )  Supplementary reserve provider's optimal 
Condition for solving RG, is: 
Assuming that the IS0 has a contract with 
supplementary reserve provider, where the quantity 
is determined by the I S 0  and the price P i  is 
determined according to (IS). 
3) Consumer's optimal condition for solving T, is: 
4) ISO's optimal conditions: 
The optimal condition for solving R, is 
By comparing (20)  with (19), we can conclude that 
the IS0 will solve an optimal amount of reserve 
capacity R, , which is same as the optimal amount of 
reserve capacity T, selected by the consumers. 
The optimal condition for solving RGah is: 
where ah be the shadow price of reserve energy 
when genco C, outages. 
4.2. Global Solution Process 
Fig. 1 shows the information flows between market 
participants. 
PRG.P_~3&~h V Tb,fb,, v h  
Ccnco i I S 0  Consumerj 
L.5 ,  Vh P2d'mA Qh 
Fig. 1 Information flows in the Reserve Market 
The corresponding solution procedures can be 
summarized as follows. Firstly, the IS0 announces 
an initial guess on reserve capacity price for selling 
it to consumers at P,' and reserve energy price at 
PRZr . According to the information provided by 
IS0, each consumer solves optimization problem 
(11) for TQ1'l . The optimal solution of Tq"' 
together with calculated f,,h(i' , ( h  = 1 N )  by (12)  
will be sent back to the IS0. 
With the demand of reserve capacity, the IS0 sets 
R,'" = Tc;l and R,>I =fa?) for all j and h, and 
solves (14) for the reference value of reserve energy 
R&'" . Then IS0 calculates RG:' ( RG?l = rARz ) 
and price Pfl""' , Pe""' (using (IS), (4)), and sends 
pfi""' , PRE,h(i) and &":I togencos. 
Genco solves the optimization problem (7) for 
Tal'), RG,"' and determines RGjJ"' (see (22)) and 
sends the solution TG(" and RGj,h(il to the ISO. 
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h = 1 - N , the market task is implemented; if not, the 
prices P,' , Pefi,h will be tuned properly (see (23), 
(24)) until the balance is set up, 
(23) 
5. FEATURES AND FURTHER DISCUSSIONS 
5.1. Centralized vs. Decentralized Approach 
The social cost (SC) for the reserve procurement 
will be the summation of the expected costs of all 
individuals with their payments and two policies 
canceledideleted, and with R,, = Tc, for all i and 
R, = Tc, for all j .  We have (see (7), (8), and (1 I ) )  
Eqn. (25) includes the reserve capacity and energy 
costs and the consumers' outage losses. It is clear 
that the objective function in (25) should be the 
same as the centralized optimization through 
maximizing social welfare or minimizing social cost 
Assuming that the reserve capacity market is pure 
competitive and there is a unique optimal solution 
for both centralized optimization problem and 
decentralized optimization problem. With the spot 
pricing theory and the first order conditions of 
optimal problems (both minimization problems have 
the same set of optimal conditions), the shadow 
prices solved in the centralized approach should be 
equivalent to the prices be solved in the 
decentralized approach, and both approaches must 
converge to the same optimal solutions. We can 
conclude that, the proposed decentralized approach 
can yield the optimal condition, which will 
maximize the economic efficiency as its centralized 
counterpart. 
5.2. Discussion 
Key features of the new approach are summarized as 
follows: 
All participants including gencos, consumers are 
attempting to solve the reserve capacity supply 
and demand and to optimize their own benefits 
with IS0  announcing key information on reserve 
capacity. - Two policies are introduced, namely, insurance 
policy and penalty policy. Insurance policy allows 
consumers to purchase reserve capacity and 
transfers risk of outage loss to the IS0  
simultaneously. Insurance policy induces 
incentives for the IS0  to maintain the amount of 
~91. 
reserve capacity same as the optimal amount 
requested by consumers. Penalty policy penalizes 
the gencos if they do not commit the reserve 
provision, which induces incentives for the gencos 
to commit the reserve capacity provision same as 
the contracted amount. 
The decentralized approach can maximize the 
social welfare same as the centralized approach 
with an objective to maximize social welfare. 
The system reliability is held, because the quantity 
of reserve capacity plus the amount of load 
shedding is greater than the loss of generation. 
6. COMPUTER TEST RESULTS 
Modified IEEE RTS-96 one-area system [ IO]  is used 
to demonstrate the suggested approach. Assume top 
14 thermal units in table 7 of [ I O ]  are in operation, 
where oil price is I 6iMbtu and coal price is $ 
4iMbtu. The generation cost function is supposed to 
be a quadratic equation: 
C ,  (&, ) = 0, + b, . S ,  + c, . SG,* (26) 
Based on the incremental heat rate data (see Table 9 
of [IO]), the coefficients q, b, and ci in eq. (26) are 
worked out and listed in Table I together with the 
forced outage probability OPi. 
Table 1 .  Generator data 
cmm-n I Unit 
Suppose there are 20 consumers in the market, each 
of them has a quadratic benefit function as eq. (27) 
with the coefficients are assumed and listed in Table 
2 
4, (Q,) = d, Qq + e j  .e,' (27) 
Table 2. Consumer data 
Assume the electricity market has completed before 
the reserve market starts to work. With the cost and 
benefit functions given above, the market clearing 
price Pwc is solved as PUc =$55.9274/MWh. 
Assume the reserve capacity cost (opportunity cost) 
functions for gencos are quadratic function as eqn. 
(28) with the coefficients listed in 
Table 3 
CRi (Rc, ) = J . R ,  + gj . R,' (28) 
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Table 3. Reserve capacity cost data 
G, RG, (MW) 
GI-G4 3.17 
Gr-Gs 0.00 
Gu-Gli 11.12 
GI1-GIa 11.33 
RI =80.04 
+- G, 0.1 
c, Rq R s l Q o  
c,- Cr 0.54 2.22% 
C6-Clo 1.60 4.64% 
Cil-Cli  5.03 7.40% 
Cla- Cio 8.84 9.50% 
(MW) 
Rr =X0.04 RL/Qr =7.28% 
Rr IQ, 
Total Social Cast 
Table 5.  Decentralized approach vs. N-l approach 
7.28% 15.22% 
$32 15.1 5 $3802.55 
N-l Approach New Decentralized Annroach 
maximizing individual benefits. This fact shows 
clearly the drawbacks of the traditional 
reliability-rule-based decision, since it might against 
individual consumers’ wills and lead to inefficiency. 
Therefore, the reserve market should encourage 
decentralized optimal decision and use centrally 
provided information to lead to the hest social 
welfare. 
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